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(a), under the doctrine announced in the 
Tucker case, supra, is applicable to such 
facts. 
Petitioner's application for relief under 
rule 31(a) is granted, and the Clerk of the 
Superior Court for the City and County 
of San Francisco is directed to file the 
notice of appeal heretofore received by 
him and to proceed with the preparation of 
the record on appeal. 
TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB, 
TOBRINER, PEEK and SCHAUER,- JJ., 
concur. 
41 Cal.Rptr. 284 
The PEOPLE. Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Monroe Smith HALL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Cr. 7963. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Nov. 25, 1964. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23. 1964. 
Defendant was convicted before the Su~ 
perior Court, Los Angeles County, Richard 
F. C. Hayden, J., of second-degree murder, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Traynor, C. J., held that error, if any, in 
admitting testimony concerning alleged 
statement of defendant that he had washed 
his shoes was harmless, but that evidence 
was insufficient to sustain conviction. 
Judgment reversed. 
McComb and Schauer, JJ., dissented. 
Opinion, CaI.App., 37 Cal.Rptr. 686, 
vacated. 
I. Arresl €=o63(4) 
Officer has reasonable cause for arrest 
if he is aware of facts that would lead man 
of ordinary care and prudence conscien· 
tiously to have strong suspicion tha~ accused 
is guilty of felony. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 836. 
2. Arresl €=o63(4) 
Although facts necessary to establish 
reasonable cause for arrest must incline 
mind to believe, they may leave some room 
for doubt. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 836. 
3. Arresl €=o63(4) 
Officers who learned that homicide vic-
tim had addressed her assailant by name and 
that defendant was only person of that name 
that victim kne\v, and who knew that de-
fendant had criminal record including COll-
viction for assault with deadly weapon had 
reasonable cause to arrest defendant wl(h-
out warrant. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 2·~5, 
836. 
4. Criminal Law ~394.1(3) 
Violation of statute requiring arresting 
officers to inform defendant of reason for 
his arrest is not ground for excluding evi-
dence obtained after otherwise lawful ar-
rest. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 841. 
5. Criminal Law _¢:::::l394.1(3) 
Violation of statute requiring officers to 
take defendant before magistrate within two 
days after arrest does not require exclusion 
of evidence as consequence of such viola-
tion. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 825. 
6. Criminal Law €=o1144(13) 
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence, 
Appellate Court must assume in favor of 
verdict existence of every fact that trier of 
fact could reasonably deduce from evidence 
and then determine whether or not reason-
able trier of fact could find defendant g11ilty 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
7. Criminal Law ¢:::::l1159(2) 
Implicit in Appellate Court's duty to 
determine legal sufficiency of evidence to 
sustain verdict is court's obligation, in prop-
er case, to appraise sufficiency and effect of 
admitted or otherwise indubitably establish-
ed facts as precluding or overcoming, 
.,. Retired Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Ju-
dicial Council 
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as matter of law, inconsistent inferences 
sought to be derived from weak and incon~ 
elusive sources. 
8. Criminal Law e=>1I69(12) 
Error, if any, in admitting testimony 
concerning alleged statement of defendant 
that he had washed his shoes was harmless. 
9. Criminal Law ¢;::)562 
To justify criminal conviction, trier of 
fact must be reasonably persuaded to near 
certainty, 
10. Homicide ¢;::)254 
Evidence was insufficient to sustain con-
viction for second-degree murder. West's 
Ann.Pen:Code, § 189. 
Don Edgar Burris and E. V. Cavanagh, 
Los Angeles, under appointment by the Su-
preme Court, for defendant and appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, 
Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Gordon Ringer, Deputy Atty. 
Gen., for plaintiff and respondent. 
TRAYNOR; Chief Justice. 
Defendant was charged by information 
with murder.1 (Pen. Code, § 187.) He 
waived a jury trial, and the court found him 
guilty of murder in the second degree. 
(Pen.Code, § 189.) He appeals from the 
judgment 2 on the ground that the evidence 
is insufficient to support it. 
Just before noon on Saturday, May 19, 
1962, a resident of a one-story hotel in Los 
Angeles noticed blood at various points 
along the hallway. He pushed open the 
door of the-kitchen used by all the residents 
of the hotel and, without entering, saw 
Ethel Mae Johnson lying in blood on the 
floor. He went to the porch and asked a 
passing female neighbor to call the police. 
I. The information nlso charged him with 
three prior felony convictions. He ad-
mitted them at trial. 
2. Defendant's appeal from the order deny-
ing a new trial is dismissed. ,(Pen. Code, 
§ 1237, subd. 2.) 
396P.2d-16 
When officers from the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Office arrived, they found the de-
cedent nude with a curtain rod and cloth 
loosely wrapped around her neck and a 
bloody rag across her midsection. She had 
been stabbed 49 times. 
There was a considerable amount of blood 
in the kitchen, two spots in an adjacent 
room that the decedent shared with her lov-
er, a trail of blood leading diagonally across 
the hall, and blood smears elsewhere on the 
floor and walls of the hallway. The investi-
gating officers noticed two soleprints and 
two heelprints made by a man's shoes in the 
blood near the body. They also found the 
kitchen window broken through, the window 
screen pushed out: some broken glass, and a 
bloody handprint on the wall just outside 
the window. A bloodstained man's glove 
lay on the kitchen floor. Its mate was found 
across the hall in a room that the decedent 
sometimes occupied. 
[1-3] Two residents of the hotel told 
the officers that while in bed earlier that 
morning they heard the decedent's voice and 
the sounds of a "commotion." Her words 
suggested to them that she was in imminent 
danger of being "cut" by a person she seem-
ed to be addressing as "Monroe." II~ter~ 
views with others closely associated \vith 
the decedent tended to indicate that defend-
ant, Monroe Hall, was the only Monroe 
that the decedent knew. He had lived at 
the hotel and was an old friend of the man 
with whom she lived. Defendant had a 
criminal record that included a conviction 
for assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. 
Code, § 245.) Although· no one had seen 
him near the premises for at least two 
weeks, including the day of the killing, the 
investigating officers teletyped their infor-
mation to the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment and asked for his arrest.3 
3. Defendant contends that his arrest with-
out a warrant was illegnl on the ground 
that it was mnde without reasonable 
cause (Pen.Code, § 836) and that evi-
dence obtained from him nfter his arrest 
was therefore inadmissible. It is true 
thnt the officers learned tbnt the decedent 
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At 9 :30 that evening, officers of the Los 
Angeles Police Department, without a war~ 
rant (Pen.Code, § 836), accosted defendant 
on the street. I-Ie cooperated fully, The 
arresting officers handcuffed him and took 
him to the 77th Street Police Station for 
booking. Defendant's testimony that after 
the booking he requested and was denied 
permission to call a lawyer was uncontra-
dicted.4 The police then transferred him to 
the Firestone Sheriff's Station where Ser-
geants Collins and Thornton, who had in-
vestigated the crime, took charge. 
The sergeants noticed a brown splotch on 
the bottom of defendant's right' shoe. Both 
shoes were removed and given to chemical 
experts who performed benzidine tests for 
the presence of blood. Parts of three spots 
removed from the arca where the instep 
meets the heel reacted positively to the 
benzidine. Only one spot was identifiable 
as human blood, but there was' not enough 
of it to permit the blood type to be ascer-
tained. Although one chemist testified that 
the spots appeared to be fresh, no test was 
made to determine their age. Detailed 
visual examinations and further benzidine 
tests made directly on the bottoms of the 
shoes failed to disclose any other traces of 
blood. 
Sergeant Collins also noted that the in-
step areas of the soles of both shoes looked 
unusually scrubbed and whitened. (At the 
trial, the judge examined the shoes closely 
and noticed, in addition' to their scrubbed 
appearance, a blackening on the whitened 
areas.) Although Sergeant Collins men-
may have been n prostitute who might 
have known another Monroe. An officer 
bas rensonable cause for an arrest, how-
ever, if he is aware of facts thnt would 
lend a man of ordinary care and prudence 
conscientiously to have n strong sus-
picion tbat the accused is guilty of n 
felony. (People v. Fischer, 4t) Ca1.2d 
442, 446. 317 P.2d 967.) The facts must 
incline the mind to believe, but they may 
leave some room for doubt. (People v. 
Ingle, 53 Ca1.2d 407, 413, 2 Ca1.Rptr. 
14, 348 P.2d 577.) These standards 
were met in this case. 
4. A violation of a defendant's statutory 
right to call a lawyer subjects the officer 
tioned his observations to the chemists, they 
made no tests to determine what caused the 
discoloration. The chemists observed glass 
fragments in the sales of the shoes, but 
specific gravity tests showed no similarity 
between these fragments and glass found at 
the scene of the crime. In addition to these 
tests, the police took photographs of two 
scratches on defendant's face. 
[4,5] At 2:30 a. m., without telling de-
fendant that he had a right to remain silent, 
Sergeants Collins and Thornton began to 
question him. At some point during the 
interrogation defendant was informed, ap-
parently for the first time,1S that he was be-
ing charged with the murder. He related in 
some detail his activities on the Saturday of 
the killing. Asked about the condition of 
his shoes, he expla.ined their clean apr:ear-
ance by referring to a walk on damp grass, 
and a shine and cleaning earlier that ~:ve­
ning. He could only speculate that shaving 
cuts might have caused the spots of blolJd. 
At the trial Sergeant Collins testified that 
defendant also said that he had washed his 
shoes with Clorox. At 3 :07 a. m., when 
questioning continued in the presence of a 
reporter, however, defendant denied having 
scrubbed his shoes. In his transcribed state-
ment he admitted knowing the decedent but 
denied stabbing her. After the interroga-
tion the police kept defendant in custody 
and did not take him before a magistrate 
until the following Wednesday.6 
At the trial, the two men who overheard 
the sounds of the crime said that they had 
gone to bed only a few hours earlier that 
responsible to a misdemeanor charge. 
(Pen.Code, § 851.5, subd. (b).) 
5. The nrresting officers violated section 
841 of the PennI Coue if they faned to 
inform defendant of the renson for his 
urrest. (Cf. Willson v. Superior Court, 
46 Ca1.2d 291, 294, 294 P.2d 36. where 
the arrest took place during the criminal 
act.) Such a violation, however, i8 not 
a ground for excluding evidence obtained 
after an otherwise lawful arrest. (See 
People v. Maddox, 46 Cn1.2d 301, 305, 
294 P.2d 6.) 
6. By failing to take defendant before a 
magistrate "within two days after bis 
arrest, excluding Sundays nnd holidays" 
PEOPLE v. HALL 
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morning after a long night of gambling and 
drinking. They made no effort to investi-
gate any of these sounds when they heard 
them. Shortly thereafter, on leaving the 
hotel, they noticed bloodstains in the hall-
way and heard nois'!s in the bathroom, but 
again made no effort to sec what might have 
happened. Instead, they Vlent out for more 
liquor. Only when they heard sirens did 
they return to the premises to speak with 
the police. 
One of these witnesses testified to hear-
ing the decedent utter six statements over 
a period of about fifteen minutes. The first 
four seemed to come from near the front 
door. "Wait a minute. I am going with 
you." "I am not going to tell the police 
anything about you," "Did he send you 
down here to do this to me?" "Here he 
come now for rea1." The other two seemed 
to come from the kitcjIen. "Monroe, don't 
kill me." 'jDon't cut my baby/' This wit-
ness admitted that he could not be sure of 
the order in which the statements were 
made. 
The other witness, awakened by the for-
mer, heard fewer statements. His testi-
mony suggests that he heard the last two 
utterances. His report, however, differs 
both as to their probabJe locale and their 
content. According to this witness, the de-
cedent was in the hallway and said: I<Mon_ 
roe, don't cut me. I will tell him I fell out 
of the bed." uMonroe, don't kill my baby." 
Both witnesses were certain that the de-
cedent said I<my baby" and not u me, baby," 
a!though there is no evidence that the de-
cedent had a baby and there is evidence that 
she was not pregnant. They also agree that 
they heard only the decedent's voice, that 
she spoke in a conversational tone, and that 
the sounds of a struggle were audible. 
Neither witness was sure whether the de-
cedent uttered j'Monroe" at the beginning 
(Pen.Code, § 825), the officers exceeded 
the maximum period during which a de-
fendaDt may be lawfully detained. Cali-
fornia law, however, does not require the 
exclusion of evidence as a consequence of 
such n violation. (Rogers v. Superior 
or at the end of the statements in which she 
used the name. The testimony of each was 
inconsistent in particulars with statements 
each had made to the police on the day of 
the killing. 
Other witnesses testified that, although 
the decedent had expressed some disap-
proval of defendant on one or two occasions, 
she was not afraid of him, and that he had 
not threatened her. No one knew if defend-
ant had any romantic interest in her. 
Defendant took the stand and told sub-
stantial1y the same story of his activities 
on the Saturday in question that he had 
given to the interrogating officers. Other 
witnesses corroborated defendant's testimo-
ny in many details. 
At the close of the trial the prosecution 
revealed that a police search "of defendant's 
·apartment turned up no damaging evidence. 
[6,7] We agree with defendant's con-
tention that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the judgment. In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence an appellate 
coc.rt I<must assume in favor of the verdict 
the existence of every fact that the [trier 
of fact] could reasonably deduce from the 
evidence and then determine whether or 
not a reasonable [trier of fact] could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." (People v. Huizenga, 34 Ca1.2d 669, 
676, 213 P.2d 710, 713; accord People v. 
Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 93, 10 Cal.Rptr. 
167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086.) 
"Implicit in our duty to determine the legal 
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict 
is our obligation, in a proper case, to ap-
praise the sufficiency and effect of admitted 
or otherwise indubitably established facts 
as precluding or overcoming, as a matter 
of law, inconsistent inferences sought to be 
derived from weak and inconclusive 
sources." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 70, 
153 P.2d 21, 27; see Jaffe, Judicial Review: 
Court, 46 Cal.2d 3. 10. 291 P.2d 929; 
cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332. 63 S.Ot. G08. 87 L.Ed. 819; MoIlo,y 
v. United States. 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 
1356, 1 L.E«.2d 1479.) 
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Question of Fact, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 1020, 
1026-31.) 
The evidence against defendant, standing 
alone, lacks substantial probative value. 
The decedent's use of the name "Monroe" 
is inconclusive. Although witnesses testi-
fied that defendant was the only Monroe 
that the decedent knew, she had been con-
victed of narcotics addiction, prostitution, 
and soliciting, and it was therefore likely 
that she had a wide and private circle of 
acquaintances. Moreover, as noted above, 
neither witness was certain whether she 
used the name at the beginning or the end 
of the statements in question. Thus, even 
if she knew no other Monroe, the testimony 
concernmg her utterances leaves open the 
substantial possibility that she was naming 
him in answer to inquiries or accusations 
by her assailant rather than as her assailant. 
The blood on defendant's shoes is like-
wise unconvincing. One of the chemical 
experts conceded that the spots could have 
been "more than a week old, or less than 
a week old." One spot was identifiable as 
human blood, but since the chemists could 
not ascertain the blood type, there is no 
evidence connecting the spot with the dece-
dent. 
[8] The fact that defendant may have 
said that he washed his shoes is equivocal 
at best.' There are many reasons for 
cleaning shoes, even with a bleaching agent. 
The so-called scrubbed appearance of the 
whitened instep areas of the soles adds little 
more. Since the whiteness was confined to 
the instep, it would seem that no attempt 
7. Since nO one informed him of his right to 
remain silent and he was deni~ counsel 
during interrogation, evidence of the al-
leged statement may have been inadmis-
sible at the trial. (Escobedo v. Illinois. 
378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed. 
2d 977.) In the course of denying a 
motion for a new trial, howeve~, the trial 
judge said: "There was no testimony by 
any person that they had, in fnct, been 
scrubbed. The impact was solely that I 
looked at them. • • • The shoes had 
this very scrubbed nppearance, and that 
is what""':'not any person's testimony 
about it. but the fact that they were so 
was made to clean other parts of the shoes. 
Yet a man's footprints were found in the 
blood on the kitchen floor, and there is ev-
idence that no one entered the kitchen be-
tween the time of the killing and the arrival 
of the police. One would therefore expect 
to find traces of blood in the threads and 
crevices of the soles of defendant's shoes. 
That expectation would be enhanced had 
the shoes been scrubbed, because scrubbing 
would tend to spread rather than localize 
the blood. Although the chemists made 
detailed examinations, they found no such 
traces. Moreover, even when thorough 
cleaning attempts are made, the sensitive 
benzidine test is capable of detecting minute 
quantities of remaining blood. (People v. 
Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 726, 31 Cal.Rptr. 
225, 382 P.2d 33; People v. Schiers, 160 
Cal.App.2d 364, 368, 324 P.2d 981, 329 P.2d 
1.) The appearance of the whitened areas 
of defendant's shoes suggests that if he 
tried to clean them, he was certainly less 
than thorough. Yet when the chemists 
performed benzidine tests directly on these 
areas, they obtained negative results. 
It is possible to speculate that the black-
ening on the whitened surfaces resulted 
from defendant's attempt to obscure the 
effects of the cleaning process. The orig-
inal areas covered by the whiteness are 
still easily identifiable, however, and most 
of the blackening is present on the instep 
that was noticeably less affected by the 
original discoloration. 
The scratches on defendant's face add 
nothing. No skin was found under the de-
scrubbed with their appearance at the 
time tha t he was taken, and the fact-
well, really the fact that they were 
scrubbed, not the fact that anyone said 
anything about them. The question of 
whether it was said, that simply tends 
to tie it to the fact that they were, in 
fact:, scrubbed when they were taken off 
his feet. But, it is the scrubbing itself, 
rather than what was said about it." 
Bence the admission of testimony con-
cerning the alleged statement was harm-
less. (Of. People v. Parham,' 60 Oal.2d 
378, 386, 33 Cal.Rpt,. 497, 384 P.2d 
1001.) 
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c:edent's fingernails and there is no other 
evidence that she scratched her assailant. 
Even if the foregoing evidence, standing 
alone, could support a finding of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, such a finding is 
undermined by other undisputed evidence 
and by the absence of evidence that would 
normally be forthcoming. 
The police found a man's shoeprints, in-
cluding two heelprints, in the blood near 
the body. Although one of defendant's 
heels bears an unusual gash that might be 
expected to show up in a print, there is no 
evidence of such a gash in the heel print. 
Further, chemical experts testified that the 
glass lodged in the soles of defendant's 
shoes was not similar to any glass found 
near the broken window. The bloody hand~ 
print on the wall outside the window sug~ 
gests that decedent or her assailant should 
have cuts on the hand or arms. Neither 
the decedent nor defendant had such cuts. 
Moreover, there is no evidence linking the 
print itself to either person. Apparently 
no fingerprints were discovered, and there 
is no evidence connecting defendant with 
the bloody glove on the kitchen floor or 
the curtain rod wrapped around the dece~ 
dent's neck. 
A police search of defendant's apart~ 
ment disclosed nothing that would connect 
him with the bloody stabbing. There was 
no testimony that defendant and deceased 
were emotionally involved in any way, and 
no other motive has been suggested for the 
crime. 
[9,10] Every attempt to connect de~ 
fendant with the details of the killing 
failed. To justify a criminal conviction, 
8. Even if we could conclude tbat the 
meager evidence presented was sufficient, 
we might be compelled to reverse the 
judgment on the ground that tbe police 
disabled the prosecution from affording 
defendant a fair trial. The police kept 
him in custody for four days. denied his 
request for counsel, and failed to make 
tests that might have been probative of 
innocence or guilt \Vhether or not due 
process requires a reasonably complete 
. investigation of a crime. it is doubtful 
that a conviction can be upheld when an 
the trier of fact must be reasonably per~ 
suaded to a near certainty. The trier must 
therefore have reasonably rejected all that 
undermines confidence. This case presents 
a mass of undisputed evidence and unex~ 
plained facts that destroys confidence in 
any inference pointing to guilt. Each item 
of evidence against defendant is so weak 
and inconclusive that together they are inM 
sufficient to constitute proof beyond a reaM 
sonable doubt.-
The judgment is reversed. 
PETERS, TOBRINER and PEEK, JJ., 
and DOOLING, J.,. concur. 
McCOMB, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. I do not believe that the foiN 
lowing statement in the majority opinion 
is an accurate statement of the law: "To 
justify a criminal conviction, the trier of 
fact must be reasonably persuaded to a near 
certainty. The trier must therefore have 
reasonably rejected all that undermines conN 
fidence." (Italics added.) 
It is my understanding that in a criminal 
case all that is necessary for a convictio!)" 
is evidence that convinces the minds of 
those charged with passing upon the facts, 
and satisfies their consciences, that the de-
fendant is guilty. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to a mathematical certainty 
or proof which excludes a possible doubt. 
(Code Civ.Proc. § 1826.) 
Section 1826 of the Code of Civil Pro~ 
cedure reads: "The law does not require 
demonstration; that is, such a degree of 
proof as, excluding possibility of error, 
inadequate investigation has produced 
limited evidence and the police have ren~ 
dered the defendant powerless to provide 
ex.culpatory evidence himself. (See In re 
Imbler. 60 Cn1.2d 554, 567. 35 Ca1.Rptr. 
293, 387 P.2d 6; People v. KUhon. 
53 Cal.2d 748, 752-754, 3 Cal.Rot •• 1, 
349 P.2d 673.) 
• Retired Justice of the Supreme Court 
sitting under nssignment by the Chairman 
of the Judicial Council. 
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produces absolute certainty; because such 
proof is rarely possible. Moral certainty 
only is required, or that degree of proof 
which produces conviction in an unprej-
udiced mind." (Sec People v. Ah Sun, 160 
Cal. 788, 791,118 P. 240; People v. Brother-
ton, 47 Cal. 388, 406.) 
I would affirm the judgment for the rea-
sons' expressed by Mr. Justice Files in the 
opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal in People v. Han (Cal. 
App.) 37 Cal.Rptr. 686. (See also Witkin, 
Cal. Evidence (1958) § 123, p. 148.) 
SCHAUER, J.,* concurs. 
Rehearing denied; McCOMB, J" dis-
senting, MOSK, ]., not participating. 
o i K::':""",,""";;"''"''-;;''''''''' , 
41 Cal.Rptr. 290 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
WIlliam REULMAN, Defendant and 
Respondent; 
One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, License No. CCB 
205, Serial No. 60 G 024889, Defendant. 
L. A. 28056. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Nov. 25, 1964. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1964. 
Proceeding to forfeit automobile al-
leged to have been used in unlawful trans-
portation of marijuana. The Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, Ben Koenig, 
J., entered a judgment denying forfeiture 
and the People appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Peek, J., held that police officers 
who observed only that defendant was 
nervous, that he had parked his automobile 
adjacent to point where narcotic user's kit 
had been found and that thereafter he took 
a rather aimless walk in the vicinity had 
no reasonable cause for detention and ques-
tioning of defendant, and the subsequent 
search and seizure disclosing contraband 
in his possession was invalid. 
Affirmed 
McComb and Schauer, JJ., dissented. 
Opinion, CaI.App., 39 Cal.Rptr. 421, 
vacated. 
I. Judgment ~559· 
Dismissal of charges of possession of 
marijuana on ground that only incrim"inat-
ing evidence was product of an unlawful 
search and seizure did not bar redetermina-
tion of propriety of arrest, search and 
seizure in proceedings to forfeit automo-
bile alleged to have been used in unlawful 
transportation of marijuana, although real 
party in interest was the same. Vv' est's 
Ann.Health & Safety Code, § 11610; 
West's Ann.Pcn.Code, § 995. 
2. Municipal Corporations €=189(1) 
Police officer in discharge of duties 
may detain and question a person when 
circumstances are such as would indicate 
to a reasonable man in like position that 
sllch course is necessary to proper discharge 
of those duties. 
3. Arrest ~63(4), 71 
Police officers who observed only that 
defendant was nervous, that he had parked 
his automobile adjacent to point where nar-
cotic user's kit had been found and that 
thereafter he took a rather aimless walk 
in the vicinity had no reasonable cause for 
detention and questioning of defendant, and 
the subsequent search and seizure disclosing 
contraband in his possession was invalid. 
West's Ann.Health & Safety Code, § 11610; 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 995. 
4. Forfeitures ~I, 5 
Purpose of forfeiture of automobile 
for. use in i11egal transportation of a nar-
cotic is deterrent in nature and there is a 
close identity to the aims and objectives of 
criminal law enforcement so that the same 
exclusionary rules should apply to improp-
• Retired Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Ju.-
dicial Council. 
